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ABSTRACT
Using an event study methodology, we investigate how
unexpected political events affect climate-sensitive sectors. We
find that events related to climate change policy have
significantly impacted returns. The clean energy sector benefitted
from the Paris Agreement, Climategate, and Fukushima since
these events increased climate change awareness and favor
toward policies related to reducing the impact of climate change.
For the utilities, energy-intensive, and transport sectors, these
events imply increased transition-related political and market
risks, which should be compensated. Events weakening climate
change policy are associated with positive abnormal returns for
the fossil energy sector. We further find that stock market
investors are quick to adapt to new information related to
climate change. Policymakers should be aware of such events’
impact on the stock market because the investors are likely to
price in both climate risk and expectation about sectors’ growth.
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Climate change is receiving a great deal of attention today from both policymakers and
the public. During the last three decades, there has been a dramatic improvement in
humanity’s understanding of the drivers of Earth’s climate (Hansen et al. 2005;
Andreae, Jones, and Cox 2005; Matthews et al. 2009; Storelvmo et al. 2016; Phillips,
Leirvik, and Storelvmo 2020). The economic consequences and societal impact of
climate change have also received much attention (Nordhaus and Yang 1996; Alley
2003; Easterling et al. 2000; Hayhoe et al. 2004; Matthews, Wilby, and Murphy 2017;
He and Liu 2018). The projected changes in temperature over the next century range
from 1◦C to more than 4◦C, which will have devastating effects for many firms.
Climate change and how society can and should adapt to it are severe challenges. Nord-
haus (2019) discusses three possible paths and concludes that the only viable path is the
one where humans reduce their emissions significantly over time.
While the effects of climate change are not observed overnight and are often neglected,
investors are increasingly interested in understanding how the shift to a greener and
cleaner economy affects firms; see for example He and Liu (2018), Teng and He
(2020), Li et al. (2020), Alsaifi, Elnahass, and Salama (2020), Sarkodie, Adams, and
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Leirvik (2020), Sarkodie et al. (2020) and Qian, Suryani, and Xing (2020). In particular,
Alsaifi, Elnahass, and Salama (2020) applied an event study method to determine how
voluntary carbon disclosure affects firms in the UK. The authors found that firms oper-
ating in carbon-intensive industries experience a more pronounced negative reaction to
voluntary carbon disclosure. Qian, Suryani, and Xing (2020) have specifically analyzed
climate policy changes for Australia. The authors also applied an event study method-
ology and found that better carbon performance has led to significantly higher market
returns during the Australian carbon tax repeal.
These studies highlight the current focus on climate risk that according to Nordhaus
and Yang (1996), is a systematic risk, meaning that it affects the whole economy, not just
a specific firm. Furthermore, climate risks can be broken down into (i) physical risk and
(ii) transition risk (Clapp et al. 2017). The former is related to extreme weather events
and their consequences, whereas the latter is related to attributes of transition to a
low-carbon economy: technological shifts, policy and regulation introduction, pro-
duction-level changes, and consumer behavior. Transition risk is likely to be realized
in the near future; therefore, the market needs to account for it.
In this paper, we study the transition risk that stems from climate change policy and
awareness. We apply an event study methodology and analyze how unexpected events
related to climate change affect the stock market. We focus on the following set of events:
(1) The Climatic Research Unit email controversy (17 November 2009), also known as
Climategate, which began after the leaking of the thousands of emails written by
employees at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia. The
leaked information was widely used by climate change deniers who claim that
climate change facts are fabricated.
(2) The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (11.03.2011; Ōkuma, Japan): The ruination
of the nuclear plant’s reactors after the Tōhoku earthquake and the ensuing tsunami
triggered their shutdown. This accident led to revision of energy policies in Japan
and other countries. Before the accident, nuclear energy, like clean energy, was an
essential part of the transition to a low-carbon economy.
(3) The UN Climate Change Conference (12 December 2015; Paris, France): The adop-
tion of the Paris Agreement (PA) that governs climate change reduction measures
from 2020 onward. Given that previous negotiation at the Copenhagen Climate
Change Conference in 2009 did not result in an agreement, the climate meeting
in Paris was a surprise in that parties agreed on and signed a bill to reduce CO2
emissions.
(4) The US presidential election (8 November 2016; U.S.A.): The outcome of the
election (USPE) was a surprise because the winning candidate lagged behind
his opponent by a large margin in poll results. The winner of the election,
Donald Trump, had clear intentions to change the climate policy legislation,
limit climate policy cooperation, and revive the coal industry in the U.S.A.
Such policy changes are expected to affect clean energy stocks as well as oil
and fossil fuel stocks.
We hypothesize that the stock market can efficiently price in new information that
these events carry. We assume that the stock market reaction to this systematic risk
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depends on the industry, similarly to Pham et al. (2019) and Birindelli and
Chiappini (2021). However, we follow the definition of climate policy-relevant sectors
provided by Battiston et al. (2017) to study the response of sector-specific exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) to the events relevant to the climate change discussion and
climate policy.
Previous event studies on climate policies looked at the European companies’
response to the Paris Agreement (Pham et al. 2019; Birindelli and Chiappini 2021),
and reaction of energy stocks from Germany (Betzer, Doumet, and Rinne 2013; Sen
and von Schickfus 2020), the U.S.A. (Diaz-Rainey et al. 2021), and in worldwide com-
parison (Ferstl, Utz, and Wimmer 2012; Mukanjari and Sterner 2018) to Fukushima
and the American election. Thus, this work differs from the previous research by focusing
on a sector-specific response of the US ETFs to a set of events that includes Climategate,
which has not been considered before in the financial studies.
Climate change policies aim to reduce carbon emissions; thus, carbon risk should be
included in investment decision making. Recent studies show that investors recognize
climate risk (Krueger, Sautner, and Starks 2020), and they require higher returns from
firms with higher emission levels (Bolton and Kacperczyk 2021). Additionally, the cost
of debt for climate-aware firms is lower compared to firms without carbon disclosure
(Jung, Herbohn, and Clarkson 2018). These findings suggest that investors require com-
pensation for holding stocks with higher climate risks. We propose that risk premiums
and changes in expectations can explain the sectors’ reaction to the events. Understand-
ing the mechanism of how individual firms and the stock market as a whole react to
changes in climate policy is critical for policymakers to create the best solution possible
for all parts of an economy.
1.1. Hypothesis
In connection with an event, the stock market could have a negative reaction, a
positive reaction, or no reaction. If there is no reaction, a chosen event does not
impact stocks. This can mean that the event is not relevant to the specific
company or market or does not convey new information that should be priced
in. Alternatively, an event-related change in price is significant but could have a
different impact on price development. In the case of the market overreacting or
underreacting, an initial price adjustment to the newly arrived information is too
large or small, meaning that the market must correct for that later to trade on
fair prices. The reaction can be efficient, and stock prices after incorporating an
information shock remain at the new level.
Considering transition climate risks, we hypothesize that all sectors except for clean
energy react negatively to climate policy-positive events, or events that take the further
discussion and policy on climate change mitigation. Clean energy is supposed to
benefit from such positive events since a more favorable environment for clean and
renewable energy development is created alongside promoting a low-carbon economy.
Because these positive events will hamper fossil fuel energy development, other
sectors, which are dependent on the fossil fuel sector’s energy supply (e.g. energy-inten-
sive, transport, and, to some degree, utility sectors), will have increased uncertainty and
risks. These risks would be caused by the shift and adaptation to a new sustainable energy
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source, which means switching to new technologies to reduce companies’ carbon foot-
print and increase energy efficiency. Improvement of energy efficiency is also the case
for the housing sector. Hypothetically, the opposite is true for climate policy-negative
events. We hypothesize that climate policy-related events cause a change in investors’
preferences, which affects demand for stocks and thus their prices.
We suggest that two events – Climategate and the USPE – are climate policy-negative
and another two – Fukushima and the PA – are climate policy-positive. We explain this
categorization below.
Climategate. The email leakage that occurred at the end of November 2009 began
a discussion on the credibility of scientific research and climate change evidence.
Public perception of climate change and its risks translates into expectations about the
development of the market. The distributed information from the leaked emails
affected public beliefs about global warming since more people began to question
whether it is happening (Leiserowitz et al. 2013).
Fukushima. There is an ongoing debate about nuclear energy and whether it can be con-
sidered clean and renewable. The casualties and environmental harm caused by the
Fukushima disaster made a shift toward other energy sources more urgent. The need
for change was obvious for Japan, which suffered from the accident directly, but also
for the rest of the world, which witnessed its consequences (Lei and Shcherbakova
2015). This event could be seen as a good point from which to reshape energy source
structures to be more sustainable.
PA. There was a need for an agreement to frame climate change and emission
targets after 2020 when the Kyoto Protocol would end. The Copenhagen meeting’s
failure to draft such an agreement led to a different negotiation approach: states
were asked to send determined national contributions before the Paris meeting.
Even though the meeting date was set in advance and market actors knew about
it, its outcome was highly unanticipated. The polarization of the opinions of
developed and developing countries made the possibility of reaching the agreement
and its form (i.e. whether it would be legally binding) questionable. Thus, the
written agreement stating a 1.5◦C warming ceiling was ‘a real positive surprise’
(Christoff 2016).
USPE. For this event as well as for the previous one, the date was known in advance.
However, the outcome was unexpected. According to the pre-election polls, another
candidate had a higher chance to win and a higher share of electoral and popular
votes according to 538 Project. The election outcome was expected to affect
climate change strategy for the U.S.A. and other parties in the UN. Trump men-
tioned his intention to remove the U.S.A. from the Paris Agreement and revive
the coal industry. As such, his decisions were expected to increase the emission
reduction burden on other countries while the U.S.A. accounted for 15% of total
global emissions as of 2014 (Christoff 2016).
4 Y. ANTONIUK AND T. LEIRVIK
2. Data and method
For the analysis, we used daily price data of ETFs from July 2009 to December 2016. An
ETF is a collection of stocks (i.e. a portfolio) that invests in assets in a specific market
segment (e.g. stocks in companies in the clean energy sector or companies in the fossil
fuel industry exclusively). As such, the ETF price can be an approximate indicator of
the industry’s future growth. Moreover, when including many stocks in a portfolio,
the firm-specific risk is reduced, making systematic risks the main price drivers. This
implies that a significant change in the price of an ETF is likely caused by a change in
a systematic risk factor, such as news related to climate change.
The stock data for the study was obtained from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices. We focused on equity ETFs launched in 2015 or earlier. Most of these ETFs invest
in companies worldwide, though companies from the U.S.A. have a large share due to the
size of the US economy, financial markets, and the companies listed in the U.S.A. We
then limited ETFs to trade within the following five industries: energy (separated in
this paper into fossil fuel and clean energy sectors), energy-intensive industries,
housing, transport, and utilities. This focus is based on Battiston et al. (2017)’s work,
which identified the former as climate-sensitive industries. The data for size and value
risk factors were obtained from Kenneth R. French’s data library. Returns of the S&P
500 Index were as a proxy for market returns.
Besides the wide range of sector-specific ETFs, we also have a set of ETFs that track the
market as a whole. The list of ETFs is available in Table A1, see Table 1 for some descrip-
tive statistics. Note that the energy sectors are interconnected since the covariance
between fossil fuel-based and clean energy is high (0.69). Both also highly covariate
with the transport sector (0.63 and 0.71, respectively).
2.1. Event study
The event study aims to define and distinguish each event’s effect from exposure to a
general market. The underlying idea is to test whether abnormal (excess) returns
around the event dates are different from the expected returns. If the event does not
carry new information for the market, there is no surprise, and thus there should be
no excess returns for the event. A traditional way of testing abnormal returns (Kothari
and Warner 2007) is presented below.
Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated as the difference between realized (historical)
and expected returns. Expected returns can be obtained from different models: mean
return, the market model, or different factor models. In this paper, we focus on the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM, introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)).
This model relates expected returns to how the overall market behaves and is provided
in Equation (1):
Rit − r ft = a+ bM(RMt − r ft)+ 1t (1)
where RM is the return to the market portfolio, r ft is a risk-free rate, and bM measures the
sensitivity for the asset i to the market. To analyze any excess returns in the event
window, we compute realized abnormal returns for each observation within the event
window.
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Table 1. Sample statistics for sectorwise daily returns for 2009–2016. Returns are given in percentages. Columns (1) to (6) report covariance among sectors.
Type Mean Std.Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skewness Kurtosis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market (1) 0.049 1.27 −7.70 −0.50 0.084 0.67 7.57 −0.23 4.35
Transport (2) 0.039 1.51 −9.10 −0.66 0.117 0.82 8.88 −0.22 4.19 0.76
Utilities (3) 0.020 0.85 −5.55 −0.42 0.058 0.50 3.91 −0.37 3.07 0.58 0.48
Energy Intensive (4) 0.040 0.86 −5.63 −0.39 0.070 0.51 3.81 −0.42 3.04 0.66 0.58 0.48
Housing (5) 0.053 1.56 −9.09 −0.57 0.067 0.70 12.24 0.34 8.96 0.62 0.55 0.47 0.50
Fossil fuels (6) 0.034 1.76 −8.99 −0.85 0.044 0.93 7.62 −0.19 2.24 0.71 0.63 0.50 0.52 0.45
Clean energy (7) 0.008 1.71 −8.78 −0.81 0.048 0.96 8.85 −0.17 3.04 0.77 0.70 0.50 0.57 0.54 0.69
SP500 0.061 1.12 −6.97 −0.41 0.090 0.59 6.89 −0.20 4.29
SMB 0.008 0.56 −2.08 −0.34 0.010 0.34 3.58 0.22 1.61













The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are a rolling sum of abnormal returns over




(Rit − E[Rit]). (2)
In Equation 2, i corresponds to each ETF, Rt is the return of the ETF at the time τ, and
E[Rit] denotes an expected return of the ETF, given by Equation (1). t1, t2 stand for the
beginning and the end of the event window, respectively.
We then added the cumulative returns for all ETFs, and computed the cross-sectional
average, denoted CAAR. It is used as an estimate for average industry cumulative return







In Equation (3), N denotes the total number of ETFs within a sector. We calculated
CAAR separately for each sector. Based on similar event studies (e.g. Oberndorfer
et al. 2013; Sorokina, Booth, and Thornton 2013; Qian, Suryani, and Xing 2020;
Alsaifi, Elnahass, and Salama 2020), we defined the event window as 1, 3, or 5 days
before and after the event. We compare the results for all event window sizes. Our
chosen model is estimated based on approximately 200 observations beginning 230
trading days before the event.
Traditional testing of abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns is done based on the
t-statistics for a single event and one company. For this paper, a test on standardized






In Equation (4), ARit is the estimated abnormal return for the ETF i on day t, and Ait is
the scaled abnormal returns. si is the regression residual standard deviation; dt is the cor-
rection term of the form x′t(X
′X)−1xt where xt and X represent vectors of explanatory
variables in the event and the estimation window, respectively.
We chose Patell’s (1976) methodology for testing, which includes the number of
observations in the estimation window (m) and the number of explanatory variables (p):
tPatell = A









, where r is the average of the sample cross-correlations of the estimation
period residuals. After multiplying Equation (5) by this factor, we obtained a new test
statistics taPatell that is adjusted for cross-correlation. We need to address cross-
correlation, because in our case ETFs track global indices and include some of the
same companies. There is also an overlap in event windows because events took place
simultaneously for every ETF.
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Robustness. We additionally compared our results against a more sophisticated model
for returns prediction derived by Fama and French (1993). This model is called the
three-factor model (FF3) and is as follows:
Rit − r ft = a+ bM(RMt − r ft)+ bsmbSMBt + bhmlHMLt + 1t (6)
In Equation (6), SMB is the returns of small firms less returns on large firms, i.e. ‘small
minus big-cap’ factor, and HML is the returns of firms with a high book-to-market value
over returns of firms with a low book-to-market value; thus, it is called the ‘high minus
low book-to-market-ratio’ factor.
According to Corrado (2011), the estimated abnormal returns in the event study are
subject to cross-sectional correlation but also event-induced volatility. To address this
issue, we used a scaled test statistic called BPM (tBMP; see Boehmer, Musumeci, and
Poulsen 1991), based on the t-test that accounts for event-induced volatility. The BPM








where s is the (cross-sectional) standard deviation of the event-day-scaled abnormal
returns. While accounting for event-induced volatility, tBMP is still prone to cross-
sectional correlation. We used the method suggested in Kolari and Pynnönen (2010)
to adjust also this test statistic for cross-correlation. A new measure is denoted as
taBMP. We used BMP test for the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns and its
adjusted version for check.
3. Empirical results
We analyzed each ETF’s reaction to climate-related events by running a regression (1) for
each ETF accounting for each event. We made a prediction based on the regression
analysis to produce abnormal returns for further testing. We then obtained abnormal
returns averaged for each ETF type and calculated CAR from 10 days before the event
to 20 days afterward (Figure 2).
This figure aids in understanding the ETFs’ reaction to the events. As one can see, the
various ETFs reacted differently in terms of both scale and direction. In the next section,
we explore each event in more detail.
3.1. Climategate
The housing sector experienced statistically significant abnormal negative returns of
1.66% on the day of the event followed by a 1.34% rebound the next day (Table 2).
This can be explained by a correction for the overreaction to the event. The market
ETFs also reacted negatively with −40 bps (basis points) on day one and down to
−84 bps over three days.
However, at the end of 2009, the real estate market was in distress after the financial
crisis, so negative abnormal returns were rather expected and could be explained by
factors other than Climategate. The transport ETFs did not react to Climategate since
neither abnormal nor cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from 0.
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Table 2. Stock market reaction to Climategate.
Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
Market (R2 = 0.903 ) Transport (R2 = 0.714) Utility (R2 = 0.59) Energy Intensive (R2 = 0.671)
−3 0.11 .77 .85 .58 .74 0.89 .62 .66 .35 .44 0.24 .39 .67 .09 .46 0.44 .35 .65 .08 .50
−2 0.35 .34 .51 .09 .27 0.15 .94 .95 .65 .74 0.41 .16 .47 .01 .21 0.28 .26 .59 .02 .33
−1 −0.18 .65 .76 .41 .61 0.57 .74 .77 .38 .48 −0.38 .19 .51 .02 .26 −0.16 .60 .80 .12 .57
0 −0.42 .12 .27 <.01 .03 0.22 .89 .90 .24 .32 −0.12 .70 .85 .19 .58 0.07 .86 .93 .45 .79
1 −0.1 .96 .97 .90 .94 0.94 .67 .70 .69 .76 −0.08 .80 .90 .49 .77 −0.19 .48 .74 .08 .50
2 −0.29 .29 .46 .05 .20 −0.62 .74 .77 .54 .64 −0.41 .20 .52 .01 .24 0.03 .83 .92 .26 .68
3 −0.14 .60 .73 .24 .45 0.05 .94 .94 .75 .81 0.32 .31 .62 .06 .40 0.32 .34 .65 .01 .27
4 0.21 .70 .79 .46 .65 −1.07 .52 .57 .02 .03 0.25 .36 .65 .08 .44 0.09 .46 .73 .08 .51
5 −0.17 .76 .84 .73 .83 −0.53 .71 .74 .12 .17 0.35 .22 .53 .02 .29 −0.07 .94 .97 .82 .94
−1, 1 −0.41 .44 .60 .15 .35 2.05 .56 .60 .53 .62 0.04 .89 .95 .58 .82 0.32 .80 .91 .53 .83
−1, 3 −0.84 .21 .38 .03 .14 1.48 .71 .74 .41 .51 −0.05 .98 .99 .89 .96 0.67 .47 .73 .03 .40
−1, 5 −0.8 .40 .56 .14 .35 −0.12 .93 .94 .79 .84 0.54 .42 .69 .06 .41 0.69 .39 .69 .01 .31
−3, 3 −0.67 .37 .54 .02 .10 2.2 .65 .68 .42 .52 −0.02 .99 .99 .94 .97 0.78 .40 .69 .01 .28
Housing (R2 = 0.736 ) Fossil (R2 = 0.715) Clean (R2 = 0.722)
−3 −0.24 .82 .92 .56 .82 0.79 .08 .54 <.01 .24 0.64 .30 .66 .09 .59
−2 −0.06 .92 .96 .80 .92 −0.21 .70 .90 .14 .77 1.16 .08 .45 <.01 .30
−1 0.71 .36 .66 .05 .42 −1.09 .03 .42 <.01 .07 −0.5 .30 .67 <.01 .24
0 −1.66 .02 .20 <.01 .01 −0.47 .25 .70 <.01 .53 −0.48 .36 .70 .02 .45
1 1.34 .10 .40 .01 .21 −0.65 .15 .63 <.01 .32 0.47 .58 .82 .14 .65
2 0.28 .82 .91 .57 .83 −0.75 .13 .60 <.01 .52 0.36 .65 .85 .17 .68
3 −0.26 .63 .82 .26 .66 −0.8 .08 .53 <.01 .29 −0.35 .46 .76 .09 .60
4 −1.03 .14 .47 <.01 .02 −0.52 .35 .75 .01 .57 −0.33 .56 .81 .27 .74
5 −0.95 .14 .46 <.01 <.01 0.24 .39 .77 .05 .70 −0.35 .53 .80 .04 .51
−1, 1 −0.56 .47 .73 .04 .39 −0.33 .65 .88 .21 .81 0.63 .69 .87 .32 .77
−1, 3 −0.54 .50 .75 .16 .57 −1.88 .07 .53 <.01 .38 0.64 .86 .94 .69 .91
−1, 5 −2.53 .10 .42 <.01 .08 −2.17 .12 .59 <.01 .36 −0.04 .76 .90 .51 .85
−3, 3 0.11 .79 .90 .65 .86 −3.19 .02 .38 <.01 .24 1.31 .64 .85 .41 .81
Note: The table reports estimated abnormal returns separately for three days before the event and five days after and CAR for various event windows (column AR), given in %. The abnormal
returns were calculated based on the CAPM and tested by the parametric (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 1991) test (column BMP) and Patell’s test (1976; column Patell). Columns aBMP
and aPatell report the tests mentioned above, but adjusted for the cross-sectional correlation by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The table reports test results as p-values (since t-values are not
directly comparable between samples due to different degrees of freedom). The underlined p-values are significant at the 10% level, and ones in bold are significant at the 5% level. R2 shows a

























A highly significant abnormal return on the fourth day of the event even after correction
for cross-correlation based on the adjusted BMP statistic (aBMP) is not likely connected
to the event.
The energy-intensive and fossil fuel ETFs’ results are controversial in terms of the
BMP testing: while the fossil fuel sector experienced statistically significant negative
abnormal returns, the energy-intensive sector received an additional 69 bps within five
days. However, these results do not hold after the correction for the cross-sectional cor-
relation. The energy-intensive ETFs’ performance in late 2009 is likely related to the con-
tinuous rise of the oil prices since mid-2008. The clean energy ETFs’ loss in returns is
significant only for 48 bps on the event day and before the test statistics adjustment.
Figure 2 shows that later the clean energy ETFs actually gained positive CAR as the
Copenhagen meeting drew nearer.
3.2. Fukushima
As mentioned earlier, we expected a positive reaction of the energy stocks in connection
with the Fukushima disaster. However, we also expected clean energy to be preferred as a
source with a minimal negative environmental production effect. This type of reaction is
exactly what is apparent for the clean energy and fossil fuel ETFs (Table 3). Their CAR
reached 5.33% and 2.37%, respectively, within five days, with the greatest abnormal
returns on the second and third days.
The Fukushima event is associated with a negative returns of 29–35 bps on the event
day and the day after for the energy-intensive sector. The utilities sector also had negative
returns of 43–73 bps on the first three days after the event. However, the statistical signifi-
cance for both sectors disappeared after the adjustment for cross-sectional correlation.
Although market abnormal returns were negative, they were not statistically signifi-
cant for most days for the BMP test, while the Patell test shows that
CAR[−1;3] = −1.06% is statistically different from 0. Transport ETFs’ abnormal
returns were not affected by the event. The housing sector’s positive significant cumulat-
ive returns were found for three and five days after the event.
3.3. The Paris agreement
The PA was positive news for the clean energy ETFs, and a series of significant abnormal
returns in the days following the announcement added up to 8.43% within five
days (Table 4). This result remains highly significant irrespective of the test applied.
The market ETFs also had a positive and statistically significant reaction to the news,
though of 10 times smaller magnitude (73 bps), which disappears for both adjusted and
Patell’s tests.
The energy-intensive sector also had a positive return of less than 1% on the days after
the event, which cumulatively reached 1.2% on the fifth day. However, their statistical
significance declines after the adjustment for cross-sectional correlation.
Unlike the clean energy ETFs, the fossil fuel ETFs lost up to 4.2% in returns in con-
nection to the PA. However, a negative reaction to the event could also be seen five days
before the event. This indicates that the fossil fuel sector anticipated negative news due to
the Paris meeting long before the agreement took place.
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Table 3. Stock market reaction to Fukushima.
Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
Market (R2 = 0.876) Transport (R2 = 0.755) Utility (R2 = 0.695) Energy Intensive (R2 = 0.718)
−3 −0.14 .50 .65 .07 .24 0.69 .37 .38 .35 .37 −0.02 .94 .97 .87 .95 0.62 .01 .12 <.01 .10
−2 0.1 .64 .75 .14 .34 0.09 .85 .85 .66 .68 0.57 <.01 .09 <.01 .14 0.22 .02 .20 .04 .38
−1 −0.28 .09 .23 .06 .21 0.56 .37 .38 .65 .67 0.27 .15 .46 .09 .44 0.28 .05 .29 .01 .21
0 −0.26 .23 .41 .12 .31 0.4 .59 .60 .27 .29 0.04 .93 .97 .87 .94 −0.29 .10 .39 <.01 .14
1 −0.07 .54 .68 .62 .76 −0.33 .54 .55 .65 .67 −0.63 <.01 .08 .02 .29 −0.35 .02 .19 <.01 .18
2 −0.4 .06 .17 .04 .17 −0.05 .87 .88 .94 .94 −0.73 <.01 .04 <.01 .10 −0.24 .23 .55 .09 .49
3 −0.19 .50 .65 .67 .79 0.61 .42 .43 .15 .16 −0.43 .02 .23 .01 .18 −0.12 .27 .58 .22 .63
4 0.63 .02 .07 .20 .42 −0.36 .67 .68 .68 .69 −0.09 .54 .76 .46 .75 0.13 .64 .82 .67 .87
5 0.33 .16 .33 .16 .37 0.37 .62 .62 .34 .36 0.23 .22 .53 .22 .59 0.36 .04 .26 .02 .29
−1, 1 −0.47 .17 .33 .16 .37 0.76 .57 .58 .34 .36 −0.62 .04 .27 .02 .29 −0.02 .48 .73 .26 .66
−1, 3 −1.06 .04 .13 .15 .36 1.32 .42 .43 .30 .32 −1.78 <.01 .03 <.01 .15 −0.38 .13 .44 .08 .47
−1, 5 −0.1 .73 .81 .51 .69 1.33 .46 .47 .39 .41 −1.64 <.01 .07 .01 .20 0.11 .53 .76 .42 .76
−3, 3 −1.25 .03 .11 .12 .32 1.98 .33 .34 .48 .50 −0.94 .04 .28 .06 .38 0.12 .59 .79 .48 .79
Housing (R2 = 0.74) Fossil (R2 = 0.717) Clean (R2 = 0.738)
−3 0.6 .03 .33 <.01 .13 −1.22 <.01 .08 <.01 .10 −0.45 .25 .61 .06 .51
−2 0.33 .23 .60 .02 .42 −0.49 .06 .48 <.01 .33 0.28 .30 .65 .20 .68
−1 0.8 .01 .24 .01 .34 −2.08 <.01 .01 <.01 .05 −0.67 .05 .36 .01 .32
0 0.04 .82 .93 .60 .87 0.68 .01 .28 .01 .47 −1.19 <.01 .12 <.01 .08
1 −0.02 .99 .99 .98 .99 1.37 <.01 .08 <.01 .10 3.15 <.01 <.01 <.01 .16
2 1.1 <.01 .11 <.01 .21 0.01 .65 .87 .58 .90 4.13 <.01 <.01 <.01 .09
3 0.44 .10 .47 .02 .41 0.79 .02 .35 .01 .50 0.26 .10 .46 .14 .62
4 −0.46 .11 .49 .08 .55 1.65 <.01 .03 <.01 .05 −0.02 .72 .88 .73 .91
5 0.57 .04 .35 <.01 .24 −0.91 <.01 .21 <.01 .22 −0.55 .30 .65 .41 .79
−1, 1 0.62 .15 .53 <.01 .28 0.83 .07 .50 .01 .52 1.51 .02 .27 .03 .46
−1, 3 2.15 <.01 .13 <.01 .04 1.63 .01 .32 .01 .52 5.9 <.01 <.01 <.01 .08
−1, 5 2.26 .01 .17 <.01 <.01 2.37 <.01 .22 <.01 .22 5.33 <.01 .01 <.01 .17
−3, 3 3.28 <.01 .07 <.01 .08 −0.94 .13 .58 .08 .68 5.51 <.01 .01 <.01 .14
Note: The table reports estimated abnormal returns separately for three days before the event and five days after and CAR for various event windows (column AR), given in %. The abnormal
returns were calculated based on the CAPM and tested by the parametric (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 1991) test (column BMP) and Patell’s test (1976; column Patell). Columns aBMP
and aPatell report the tests mentioned above, but adjusted for the cross-sectional correlation by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The table reports test results as p-values (since t-values are not
directly comparable between samples due to different degrees of freedom). The underlined p-values are significant at the 10% level, and those in bold are significant at the 5% level. R2 shows

























The transport ETFs did not have statistically significant returns in connection with the
event. At the same time, utilities and housing ETFs experienced some positive move-
ments in the returns, which cumulatively reached 1.59 and 1.86%, respectively.
3.4. The US election
The results of the USPE 2016 led to highly significant negative abnormal returns in all
sectors in the study except for transport, which showed some negative returns at the
10% significance level. Since most sectors had significant negative CAR according to
one test or both, we can conclude that the USPE was taken as news that increased uncer-
tainty. However, the magnitude of the reaction differed across sectors. Within five days,
market ETFs lost 3.09% in returns. If we consider this result to represent a general reac-
tion pattern, energy-intensive and housing sectors were just in line with the negative
market reaction. They had −3.11 and −2.91% in abnormal returns,
respectively (Table 5).
However, the results for the energy sectors stand out. The comparison of the reaction
based on CAR[−1; 5] shows that although fossil fuel ETFs had a negative abnormal return
of −2.78%, this is 40 bps better than the average market ETFs loss. Moreover, after a
period of some abnormal return fluctuations, fossil fuel cumulative returns rebounded
after two weeks (Figure 2). In contrast, the clean energy sector cumulatively lost 5.55%
in abnormal returns.
The magnitude and sign of the estimated abnormal returns from the CAPM and FF3
model (Table A2) are similar. The same applies to the test results based on the BMP and
Patell tests for these models. However, the adjustment for cross-sectional correlation
reveals that the significance of the reaction holds for fossil fuel (positive), clean energy
(positive), and utilities (negative) ETFs for the Fukushima event; clean energy (positive)
ETFs for the Paris Agreement; and all (negative) ETFs for the USPE. These results suggest
that climate change-related events have a prominent effect on the energy sector.
4. Discussion
Based on the analysis results, accompanied by Figures 1 and 2, we can summarize the
overall impact of the climate-related events on the stock market.
Climategate seems to have brought a negative news shock to all sectors in our study
(Figure 1). However, it is associated with a temporary shock that was compensated for
within a few days. The evidence is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that cumulative
returns were approximately zero (energy-intensive, transport, and clean energy sectors)
or maintained the same level and dynamic as before the event (market, utilities, housing,
and fossil fuel sectors). This reaction was concentrated within the first 10 days after the
event. Later price development is likely to have been affected by the anticipation of the
Copenhagen meeting. A negative reaction to Climategate suggests that the market accounts
for the climate change discussion and prices its risks. Since climate change evidence was
questioned, the market tried to adjust prices so as not to overcompensate for climate risks.
The stock market reaction to the Fukushima accident was similar. All sectors except
fossil fuels had an initial negative reaction since abnormal returns on the event day (day 0
on Figure 1) were below zero on average. Even though negative returns were present a
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Table 4. Stock market reaction to the Paris Agreement.
Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
Market (R2 = 0.781) Transport (R2 = 0.582) Utility (R2 = 0.364) Energy Intensive (R2 = 0.706)
−3 −0.02 .31 .52 .20 .46 −0.4 .51 .61 .29 .50 0.11 .56 .82 .45 .81 0.43 .03 .30 .02 .34
−2 −0.27 .12 .31 .01 .11 −0.12 .91 .93 .94 .97 −0.97 <.01 .09 <.01 .14 −0.44 .02 .26 <.01 .14
−1 0.19 .46 .64 .29 .55 1.08 .15 .23 .23 .43 0.47 .01 .26 .01 .34 −0.02 .35 .67 .19 .61
0 0.04 .38 .57 .54 .73 −0.96 .17 .26 .08 .20 0.09 .00 .00 .00 .00 0.22 .06 .38 .08 .49
1 −0.09 .59 .74 .48 .70 −0.35 .52 .62 .29 .49 0.19 .31 .69 .04 .48 −0.41 .14 .50 .06 .45
2 0.28 .36 .56 .18 .44 0.08 .81 .86 .73 .84 1.01 <.01 .07 <.01 .14 0.49 <.01 .11 <.01 .10
3 0.14 .80 .87 .63 .79 −2.38 .04 .07 .37 .57 0.68 .01 .26 <.01 .30 0.09 .66 .84 .55 .82
4 0.42 .13 .32 .08 .30 0 .86 .90 .94 .96 0.14 .68 .87 .63 .88 0.22 .24 .59 .46 .78
5 −0.03 .85 .91 .76 .86 0.49 .41 .53 .27 .48 −0.64 <.01 .20 .01 .34 0.15 .35 .67 .34 .72
−1, 1 −0.07 .43 .61 .46 .68 −1.71 .17 .26 .14 .30 0.39 .36 .72 .10 .58 0.24 .12 .48 .08 .48
−1, 3 0.35 .27 .47 .04 .22 −4.01 .07 .11 .33 .53 2.09 <.01 .11 <.01 .21 0.83 .01 .18 <.01 .16
−1, 5 0.73 .13 .32 .02 .13 −3.52 .11 .17 .17 .35 1.59 .02 .34 .01 .36 1.2 .02 .27 <.01 .20
−3, 3 0.27 .53 .69 .16 .41 −3.05 .15 .23 .46 .65 1.59 .01 .25 <.01 .18 0.37 .22 .57 .07 .47
Housing (R2 = 0.441) Fossil (R2 = 0.427) Clean (R2 = 0.512)
−3 0.85 <.01 .16 <.01 .28 −1.37 <.01 .27 <.01 .15 −0.27 .29 .64 .28 .71
−2 −0.52 .02 .38 <.01 .35 0.36 .34 .76 .10 .80 −0.64 .04 .33 .02 .36
−1 −0.22 .23 .68 .17 .73 1.94 <.01 .12 <.01 .33 1.02 .01 .17 <.01 .09
0 −0.18 .18 .64 .30 .79 −0.59 .19 .68 .05 .75 1.49 .01 .15 .07 .52
1 0.22 .24 .68 .09 .66 1.19 .01 .36 <.01 .49 0.87 .04 .33 .02 .37
2 0.87 <.01 .14 <.01 .19 −2.33 <.01 .11 <.01 .45 3.09 <.01 <.01 <.01 .05
3 0.58 .01 .33 <.01 .41 −0.95 .04 .48 <.01 .26 1.11 .01 .15 <.01 .07
4 −0.07 .77 .92 .67 .91 0.5 .17 .66 .03 .71 1.77 <.01 .05 <.01 .08
5 −0.41 .06 .50 .02 .54 −0.72 .09 .58 .01 .67 0.38 .57 .80 .43 .79
−1, 1 0.89 .03 .43 .04 .57 −0.77 .27 .73 .15 .82 2.09 .02 .26 .09 .54
−1, 3 2.34 <.01 .10 <.01 .20 −4.05 <.01 .19 <.01 .21 6.28 <.01 .01 <.01 .17
−1, 5 1.86 <.01 .25 <.01 .36 −4.27 <.01 .25 <.01 .40 8.43 <.01 <.01 <.01 .16
−3, 3 1.59 .01 .34 .01 .45 −1.76 .21 .69 .03 .71 6.67 <.01 .01 <.01 .13
Note: The table reports estimated abnormal returns separately for three days before the event and five days after and CAR for various event windows (column AR), given in %. The abnormal
returns were calculated based on the CAPM and tested by the parametric (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 1991) test (column BMP) and Patell’s test (1976; column Patell). Columns aBMP
and aPatell report the tests mentioned above, but adjusted for the cross-sectional correlation by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The table reports test results as p-values (since t-values are not
directly comparable between samples due to different degrees of freedom). The underlined p-values are significant at the 10% level, and those in bold are significant at the 5% level. R2 shows

























Table 5. Stock market reaction to the American election.
Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
Market (R2 = 0.814) Transport (R2 = 0.685) Utility (R2 = 0.251) Energy Intensive (R2 = 0.476)
−3 −0.43 .10 .27 .16 .41 −0.19 .90 .93 .91 .96 0.23 .22 .65 .16 .68 0.26 .14 .49 .03 .37
−2 −0.27 .96 .98 .97 .98 0.24 .55 .66 .39 .63 −0.3 .16 .60 .03 .49 −0.66 <.01 .06 <.01 .04
−1 0.19 .78 .86 .66 .81 0.83 .21 .33 .07 .20 0.47 .03 .41 <.01 .36 −0.32 .03 .29 .03 .37
0 −0.07 .71 .81 .52 .71 −1.02 .22 .33 .07 .21 0.4 .04 .44 .01 .37 0.59 .01 .18 <.01 .14
1 −1.18 <.01 <.01 .04 .19 −1.05 .21 .32 .10 .27 −2.7 <.01 <.01 <.01 .09 −1.69 <.01 <.01 <.01 .12
2 −0.55 .06 .20 .31 .56 1.45 .09 .15 .06 .19 −2.08 <.01 <.01 <.01 .12 −1.78 <.01 <.01 <.01 .11
3 −0.46 .01 .05 .23 .49 −0.26 .88 .91 .87 .93 −0.77 <.01 .16 .03 .50 −0.32 .18 .54 .34 .72
4 −0.3 .64 .77 .77 .87 1.78 .06 .11 .07 .20 −0.37 .07 .49 .01 .42 −0.12 .40 .70 .42 .76
5 −0.11 .34 .54 .26 .51 −0.37 .54 .65 .01 .02 0.73 <.01 .18 <.01 .33 −0.05 .71 .87 .61 .84
−1, 1 −1.67 <.01 .01 .01 .09 −2.26 .18 .29 .25 .50 −2.06 <.01 .04 <.01 .13 −0.84 <.01 .08 .02 .34
−1, 3 −2.68 <.01 <.01 .06 .26 −1.08 .84 .89 .91 .95 −4.92 <.01 <.01 <.01 .13 −2.94 <.01 <.01 <.01 .17
−1, 5 −3.09 <.01 .01 .07 .26 0.33 .42 .55 .64 .81 −4.56 <.01 <.01 <.01 .16 −3.11 <.01 <.01 <.01 .17
−3, 3 −2.77 <.01 .01 .10 .32 −0.01 .52 .64 .73 .86 −4.74 <.01 <.01 <.01 .20 −3.91 <.01 <.01 <.01 .13
Housing (R2 = 0.384) Fossil (R2 = 0.481) Clean (R2 = 0.615)
−3 −0.36 .03 .50 .01 .54 −1.46 .01 .32 <.01 .23 −0.73 .04 .32 <.01 .19
−2 0.7 <.01 .20 <.01 .26 −0.65 .16 .65 <.01 .08 −0.06 .89 .95 .84 .94
−1 −0.15 .34 .77 .07 .68 0.88 .05 .51 <.01 .52 −0.38 .43 .72 .42 .77
0 0.06 .72 .91 .53 .89 −0.81 .10 .59 <.01 .23 0.04 .76 .89 .70 .89
1 −1.79 <.01 .01 <.01 .36 0.12 .94 .98 .91 .99 −3.83 <.01 <.01 <.01 .13
2 −1.47 <.01 .04 <.01 .46 −0.62 .18 .67 .02 .71 −0.82 .02 .23 .12 .56
3 0.18 .19 .68 .27 .80 −1.95 <.01 .16 <.01 .19 −0.2 .89 .95 .92 .97
4 1.4 <.01 .02 <.01 .13 0.43 .48 .83 .20 .85 0.08 .94 .97 .93 .97
5 −0.93 <.01 .11 <.01 .19 1.51 <.01 .29 .01 .63 −0.08 .92 .96 .88 .96
−1, 1 −2.09 <.01 .05 <.01 .20 −2.15 .01 .37 <.01 .19 −4.51 <.01 <.01 <.01 .10
−1, 3 −3.38 <.01 .03 <.01 .33 −4.72 <.01 .14 <.01 .18 −5.54 <.01 <.01 .01 .24
−1, 5 −2.91 <.01 .10 <.01 .43 −2.78 .02 .42 <.01 .61 −5.55 <.01 .01 .02 .33
−3, 3 −2.83 <.01 .12 <.01 .46 −4.49 <.01 .23 <.01 .31 −5.98 <.01 .01 .01 .27
Note: The table reports estimated abnormal returns separately for three days before the event and five days after and CAR for various event windows (column AR), given in %. The abnormal
returns were calculated based on the CAPM and tested by the parametric (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 1991) test (column BMP) and Patell’s test (1976; column Patell). Columns aBMP
and aPatell report the tests mentioned above, but adjusted for the cross-sectional correlation by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The table reports test results as p-values (since t-values are not
directly comparable between samples due to different degrees of freedom). The underlined p-values are significant at the 10% level, and those in bold are significant at the 5% level. R2 shows













few days afterward in the history of the energy-intensive and utilities sectors and the
market in general, prices reverted later. This means that Fukushima caused some uncer-
tainty in the market, but as more information about the event and its scope and handling
became available, prices stabilized. However, the clean energy, fossil fuel, and transport
sectors experienced a qualitative shift in the price level since after the initial drop they
recovered and began to perform better than before the event. Our results for the ETFs
are similar to those obtained by Lei and Shcherbakova (2015) for stocks: they capture
an expected behavior on the market because other energy sources would benefit from
nuclear energy being compromised. These benefits could be associated with greater
future growth in other sectors of the energy industry. However, contrary to Ferstl,
Utz, and Wimmer (2012), who used bootstrapping for the inference, our analysis
shows a significant positive impact on the clean energy ETFs with the FF3 specification.
Figure 1. Distribution of the abnormal returns from the capital asset pricing model calculated from
two days before the event until five days after event. Y -axis – estimated abnormal returns (in percen-
tages), x-axis – days.
Figure 2. Cumulative abnormal returns from the capital asset pricing model calculated from 10 days
before the event until 20 days after the event.
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The PA caused a positive price development in the market. The market in general and
the utilities, energy-intensive, and housing sectors in particular also remained optimistic
after the event. The PA created a positive long-term change for the clean energy sector
since its CAR increased dramatically. However, this sector likely overreacted since
CAR declined after 11 trading days. Such results suggest that better market conditions
for clean energy development are anticipated.
Because the PA was not a one-day event, it appears that the sectors analyzed here antici-
pated some changes in climate change policy since the CAR of the fossil fuel and transport
sectors also decreased before the agreement announcement, corroborating the results of
Pham et al. (2019) for Germany and Diaz-Rainey et al. (2021) for the US oil and gas com-
panies. However, new information about the agreement reached further reduced asset
values in the U.S.A. as was the case for the EU (Birindelli and Chiappini 2021).
The expectation about different restrictive measures against fossil fuels (i.e. extraction
limits, required carbon compensation) and transport (i.e. emission control) affected these
sectors’ growth estimation.
The results show that the USPE was a major surprise for the stock market in general.
Increased uncertainty about the future of the economy and policies of the new president
reduced all returns. Only transport recovered shortly after the price drop, meaning its nega-
tive overreaction to USPE results had a temporary effect; later, CAR became positive and
stable, which is likely due to the agenda featuring policies favorable for this sector. If we
increase the period after the event to 20 days, the USPE had a similar effect for fossil fuel
ETFs since CAR reverted to 0 (see Figure 1 for a graphical illustration). This finding is
similar to the results of Diaz-Rainey et al. (2021) for stocks. A dramatic CAR recovery
occurred when Trump announced his new team on 29 November (day 15). For other
sectors, theUSPEhad a significant permanent effect: theirCARdroppedwith no subsequent
recovery. One could argue that such a reaction could simply be a response to the election
itself and not connected to climate change risks. However, our results contrast with those
of Blau, Griffith, and Whitby (2019), who found a positive reaction of pharmaceutical and
healthcare companies to the USPE. This means that the reaction is indeed sector-specific
and can be connected to the candidate’s political program concerning climate-related issues.
Considering sector-specific responses, the ETFs’ reaction to the events has a systema-
tic character. In terms of the climate change risks for each type of ETF, clean energy ETFs
have lower transition risks since the firms in such ETFs have smaller carbon footprints.
We argue that expectations about clean energy development are among the major factors
that drive stock prices in this sector and others. Renewable energy prices has the potential
to be lower than those of fossil fuels. If climate change policy supports the transition to a
low-carbon economy and thus creates favorable conditions for clean energy, its prices are
likely to decrease in the future. The utilities, energy-intensive, and housing sectors will
benefit from lower energy prices. The International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA) statistics also show that solar energy costs became comparable to those gener-
ated by fossil fuels in 2016 and that renewable energy costs decreased later.1
In contrast, transportation is strongly dependent on fossil fuels and is among the most
significantly emitting sectors, accounting for 28% of total greenhouse gas emissions in
the U.S.A. and 14% worldwide (see US EPA 2019a, 2019b). Thus, this sector will be nega-
tively affected by a transition to a low-carbon economy. This might imply an increase in
fossil energy costs and a challenging change for most of the current vehicles in this sector.
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Our findings suggest that sector-specific climate sensitivity, discussed in Battiston et al.
(2017) via climate stress testing of the financial system in five-year intervals up to 2050, is
also present in the stock market for a shorter horizon. The stock market and ETF stocks in
particular experience price adjustments in connection to climate change-related events.
Namely, these events are associated with lowering of transition political risks (PA) and
transition market risks (Climategate, Fukushima) since they motivate the shift to and
development of cleaner energy sources based on current climatic issues. One possible
explanation of changes in the non-energy ETFs’ return could be the transition climate
risk premium. Since climate transition risks become better recognized after climate-
related events, investors adjust prices to account for the potential risk premium. Climate
change policy addresses the reduction of carbon emissions. It makes sectors dependent
on energy, especially fossil fuel energy, sensitive to the policy-related decisions. The
more restrictive the climate policy expected, the higher the transition climate risks
implied and the higher the compensation for the accompanying risks and vice versa.
This is exactly what happened in case of the PA, for instance, since the utilities, energy-
intensive, and housing sectors’ returns increased. In contrast, these sectors’ returns
decreased when less focus on climate change was expected after the USPE.
In summary, we investigated how investors in financial markets account for climate
change risk by performing an event study of 118 ETFs from six different industry
sectors. In most cases, the effects of the selected events were significant for the sectors
we studied. Not surprisingly, we found that the energy industry has the highest magni-
tude of abnormal returns related to the events for both the fossil fuel and clean or renew-
able energy sectors. Other sectors’ dependence on energy shaped their reaction to the
events. The sectors’ responses to the events have a systematic character that is
reflected in the directions of the abnormal price changes around similar events: the
response pattern is the same for events that similarly contribute to the discussion of
climate change consequences and policies. We argue that the stock market recognizes
events that carry new information about transition climate risks, and investors in the
market are quick to adjust prices accordingly. This implies that policymakers should
be aware of the market reactions to climate change policy since investors price the
accompanying changes in terms of both risk and growth expectations.
Note
1. IRENA. 2020. How Falling Costs Make Renewables a Cost-effective Investment (webpage).
Disclosure statement
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Data
Table A1. List of the selected ETFs used in this study.
Ticker ETF Name Ticker ETF Name
Market Fossil fuels
EEM iShares MSCI Emerging Markets FXN First Trust Energy AlphaDEX ETF
EFA iShares MSCI EAFE IEO iShares US Oil & Gas Explor&Prodtn
IWM iShares Russell 2000 IPW SPDR S&P International Energy Sect ETF
IWV iShares Russell 3000 IXC iShares Global Energy
SPY SPDR S&P 500 ETF IYE VanEck Vectors Environmental Svcs ETF
VEA Vanguard FTSE Developed Markets ETF KOL VanEck Vectors Coal ETF
VGK Vanguard FTSE Europe ETF OIH VanEck Vectors Oil Services ETF
VTI Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF RYE Guggenheim S&P 500 Equal Wt Energy ETF
Utilities USO United States Oil
EMIF iShares Emerging Markets Infrastructure ETF VDE Vanguard Energy ETF
FUTY Fidelity MSCI Utilities Index ETF XES SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Equipment & Svcs ETF
FXU First Trust Utilities AlphaDEX Fund XLE Energy Select Sector SPDR ETF
GHII Guggenheim S&P High Income Infrastructure ETF XOP SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Explor & Prodtn ETF
GII SPDR S&P Global Infrastructure ETF Clean energy
IDU iShares U.S. Utilities ETF EVX VanEck Vectors Environmental Svcs ETF
IGF iShares Global Infrastructure ETF FAN First Trust ISE Global Wind Energy Index Fund
INXX Columbia India Infrastructure Index Fund GEX VanEck Vectors Global Alternative Energy ETF
JHMU John Hancock Multi-Factor Utilities ETF ICLN iShares Global Clean Energy ETF
JXI iShares Global Utilities ETF KWT VanEck Vectors Solar Energy ETF
PSCU PowerShares S&P SmallCap Utilities Portfolio PBD PowerShares Global Clean Energy Portfolio ETF
PUI PowerShares DWA Utilities Momentum Portfolio PBW PowerShares WilderHill Clean Energy Portfolio
ETF
PXR PowerShares Emerging Markets Infrastructure ETF PUW PowerShares WilderHill Progressive Energy
Portfolio ETF
RYU Guggenheim S&P Equal Weight Utilities PZD PowerShares Cleantech Portfolio ETF
SDP ProShares Ultra Short Utilities QCLN First Trust NASDAQ Clean Edge Green Energy
Index Fund
TOLZ ProShares DJ Brookfield Global Infrastructure ETF TAN Guggenheim Solar ETF
UPW ProShares Ultra Utilities Housing
UTES Reaves Utilities ETF DXJR WisdomTree Japan Hedged Real Estate Fund
UTLF iShares Edge MSCI Multifactor Utilities ETF EWRE Guggenheim S&P 500 Equal Weight Real Estate
ETF
VPU Vanguard Utilities ETF FLM First Trust ISE Global Engineering and
Construction ETF
XLU Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund FREL Fidelity MSCI Real Estate Index ETF
Energy intensive FRI First Trust S&P REIT Index Fund
BFIT Global X Health & Wellness Thematic ETF ICF iShares Cohen & Steers REIT ETF
CARZ First Trust NASDAQ Global Auto Index Fund ITB iShares U.S. Home Construction ETF
CNSF iShares Edge MSCI Multifactor Consumer Staples
ETF
IYR iShares U.S. Real Estate ETF
CPER United States Copper Index Fund KBWY PowerShares KBW Premium Yield Equity REIT
Portfolio
CUPM iPath Pure Beta Copper ETN LARE Tierra XP Latin America Real Estate ETF
DBB PowerShares DB Base Metals Fund MORT VanEck Vectors Mortgage REIT Income ETF
ECON Columbia Emerging Markets Consumer ETF MRRL ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Mortgage REIT
ETN
FOIL iPath Pure Beta Aluminum ETN NURE NuShares Short-Term REIT ETF
FSTA Fidelity MSCI Consumer Staples Index ETF OLD Long-Term Care ETF
FTXG First Trust Nasdaq Food & Beverage ETF PAVE US Infrastructure Development ETF
FXG First Trust Consumer Staples AlphaDEX Fund PKB PowerShares Dynamic Building & Construction
HEVY iPath Pure Beta Industrial Metals ETN PRME First Trust Heitman Global Prime Real Estate ETF
IYK iShares U.S. Consumer Goods ETF PSR PowerShares Active U.S. Real Estate Fund
JHMS John Hancock Multifactor Consumer Staples ETF REM iShares Mortgage Real Estate Capped ETF
JJC iPath Dow Jones-UBS Copper ETN REZ iShares Residential Real Estate Capped ETF
(Continued )
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Appendix 2. Analysis results
This section presents the regression results for the ETFs’ returns for the FF3 (for details, see Sub-
section 2.1). Figure A1 shows the dynamic of CAR beginning 10 days before each event.
In Table A2, each event was tested separately (i.e. for each event, abnormal returns for the event
window were estimated and tested in addition to CAR).
Table A1. Continued.
Ticker ETF Name Ticker ETF Name
JJM iPath Dow Jones-UBS Industrial Metals ETN ROOF IQ US Real Estate Small Cap ETF
JJN iPath Dow Jones-UBS Nickel ETN RORE Hartford Multifactor REIT ETF
JJT iPath Dow Jones-UBS Tin ETN RWR SPDR Dow Jones REIT ETF
JJU iPath Dow Jones-UBS Aluminum ETN SCHH Schwab US REIT ETF
KXI iShares Global Consumer Staples ETF SRET Global X SuperDividend REIT ETF
LD iPath Dow Jones-UBS Lead ETN USRT iShares Core U.S. REIT ETF
LEDD iPath Pure Beta Lead ETN VNQ Vanguard REIT ETF
NINI iPath Pure Beta Nickel ETN WREI Wilshire US REIT ETF
PBJ PowerShares Dynamic Food and Beverage XHB SPDR S&P Homebuilders ETF
PSCC PowerShares S&P SmallCap Consumer Staples
Portfolio
XLRE Real Estate Select Sector SPDR Fund
PSL PowerShares DWA Consumer Staples Momentum
Portfolio
Transport
RHS Guggenheim S&P Equal Weight Consumer Staples IYT iShares Transportation Average ETF
RJZ RICI-Metals ETN SEA Guggenheim Shipping ETF
SOIL Global X Fertilizers/Potash ETF XTN SPDR S&P Transportation ETF
UBM E-TRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Industrial Metals
ETN
VDC Vanguard Consumer Staples ETF
XLP Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR Fund
Figure A1. Cumulative abnormal returns from Fama-French three-factor model calculated from 10
days before the event to 20 days after event.
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Table A2. Stock market reaction to the selected events.
Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
Market Transport Utility Energy Intensive
Climategate
R2 = 0.931 R2 = 0.729 R2 = 0.609 R2 = 0.717
−3 0.09 .77 .85 .27 .51 0.52 .83 .85 .78 .83 0.14 .60 .80 .18 .56 0.27 .78 .89 .62 .86
−2 0.34 .33 .52 .08 .28 0.01 .96 .97 .86 .90 0.36 .21 .53 .01 .24 0.19 .39 .68 .07 .47
−1 −0.17 .70 .80 .48 .68 0.68 .66 .70 .07 .10 −0.38 .19 .50 .02 .25 −0.16 .60 .80 .22 .64
0 −0.42 .12 .29 .01 .07 0.24 .87 .89 .03 .04 −0.13 .68 .84 .18 .56 0.06 .90 .95 .56 .83
1 −0.09 .85 .90 .68 .81 1.16 .57 .61 .56 .65 0 .97 .99 .92 .97 −0.06 .84 .92 .56 .83
2 −0.28 .24 .43 .01 .07 −0.44 .86 .88 .81 .86 −0.37 .25 .56 .01 .24 0.11 .59 .80 .05 .44
3 −0.15 .66 .78 .32 .56 −0.04 .99 .00 .97 .98 0.29 .37 .65 .08 .43 0.26 .43 .70 .02 .33
4 0.2 .69 .79 .44 .65 −1.33 .44 .48 .05 .07 0.13 .59 .79 .22 .60 −0.09 .98 .99 .95 .98
5 −0.17 .81 .88 .79 .88 −0.6 .68 .71 .10 .14 0.31 .27 .58 .03 .32 −0.14 .72 .86 .28 .69
(−1; 1) −0.42 .49 .65 .17 .41 1.92 .59 .63 .59 .68 0.01 .94 .97 .74 .89 0.27 .91 .96 .79 .92
(−1; 3) −0.84 .22 .41 .04 .19 1.44 .71 .75 .42 .52 −0.07 .95 .98 .79 .91 0.63 .49 .74 .04 .42
(−1; 5) −0.82 .40 .58 .18 .42 −0.49 .84 .86 .62 .71 0.37 .56 .77 .12 .49 0.41 .65 .83 .15 .59
(−3; 3) −0.68 .40 .58 .08 .27 2.13 .65 .69 .40 .50 −0.09 .94 .97 .70 .87 0.67 .48 .73 .03 .36
Fukushima
R2 = 0.928 R2 = 0.764 R2 = 0.697 R2 = 0.757
−3 −0.17 .38 .57 .07 .28 0.71 .35 .36 .38 .40 −0.03 .88 .94 .76 .90 0.69 <.01 .07 <.01 .07
−2 0.05 .99 .99 .95 .97 0.11 .81 .81 .68 .70 0.56 <.01 .09 <.01 .14 0.33 <.01 .09 .02 .27
−1 −0.29 .11 .28 .08 .30 0.48 .39 .40 .68 .70 0.32 .09 .38 .06 .39 0.44 .01 .11 <.01 .10
0 −0.32 .06 .20 .02 .13 0.52 .49 .50 .10 .11 −0.04 .57 .78 .39 .71 −0.33 .06 .30 <.01 .08
1 −0.03 .75 .84 .80 .89 −0.38 .49 .50 .63 .66 −0.6 <.01 .09 .03 .30 −0.37 .01 .14 <.01 .15
2 −0.34 .07 .23 <.01 .04 −0.2 .95 .95 .97 .97 −0.64 <.01 .06 <.01 .10 −0.12 .57 .78 .34 .71
3 −0.09 .56 .71 .57 .75 0.31 .64 .65 .05 .06 −0.25 .17 .48 .02 .27 0.11 .74 .87 .64 .86
4 0.49 .13 .32 .40 .64 −0.12 .00 .00 .00 .00 −0.23 .14 .44 .08 .43 0.13 .66 .83 .65 .86
5 0.37 .04 .16 .06 .25 0.26 .73 .74 .55 .58 0.3 .10 .39 .12 .48 0.45 .01 .15 <.01 .16
(−1; 1) −0.52 .08 .24 .10 .32 0.85 .52 .53 .25 .27 −0.67 .02 .22 .02 .27 −0.02 .46 .71 .25 .64
(−1; 3) −0.96 .06 .20 .14 .38 0.96 .51 .52 .34 .37 −1.57 <.01 .04 <.01 .15 −0.03 .49 .73 .35 .71
(−1; 5) −0.1 .76 .85 .48 .69 1.1 .50 .52 .45 .48 −1.5 <.01 .09 .01 .20 0.56 .66 .83 .49 .79
(−3; 3) −1.19 .04 .15 .10 .32 1.55 .38 .39 .54 .57 −0.69 .11 .41 .10 .46 0.74 .06 .31 .02 .29
Paris agreement
R2 = 0.86 R2 = 0.61 R2 = 0.373 R2 = 0.727
−3 0.01 .27 .51 .09 .37 −0.29 .62 .71 .36 .56 0.08 .67 .87 .54 .84 0.42 .05 .35 .02 .37



























Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
−1 0.2 .54 .73 .30 .61 1.18 .12 .19 .20 .38 0.39 .02 .32 .01 .38 −0.07 .19 .55 .09 .52
0 0.12 .54 .73 .50 .74 −0.59 .31 .42 .14 .29 −0.04 .46 .77 .31 .74 0.16 .24 .60 .17 .60
1 −0.15 .87 .92 .88 .94 −0.44 .43 .54 .34 .54 0.14 .44 .76 .16 .64 −0.46 .13 .50 .08 .50
2 0.3 .30 .55 .17 .48 0.09 .80 .85 .68 .81 1.06 <.01 .05 <.01 .12 0.53 <.01 .10 <.01 .11
3 0.14 .60 .77 .30 .61 −2.46 .03 .06 .36 .55 0.75 <.01 .21 <.01 .27 0.14 .47 .75 .31 .71
4 0.4 .30 .54 .51 .75 −0.2 .61 .70 .82 .89 0.27 .28 .67 .19 .67 0.3 .48 .75 .64 .87
5 −0.03 .56 .74 .44 .71 0.54 .37 .47 .26 .45 −0.66 <.01 .18 .01 .33 0.14 .39 .70 .39 .75
(−1; 1) −0.01 .37 .60 .26 .57 −1.32 .24 .34 .20 .38 0.17 .79 .92 .55 .85 0.12 .31 .65 .15 .58
(−1; 3) 0.43 .18 .42 .01 .14 −3.69 .07 .12 .35 .55 1.98 <.01 .13 <.01 .18 0.79 .01 .22 <.01 .14
(−1; 5) 0.8 .10 .31 .01 .10 −3.34 .11 .17 .17 .34 1.59 .02 .34 .01 .33 1.23 .02 .28 <.01 .20
(−3; 3) 0.35 .46 .67 .04 .26 −2.66 .17 .26 .50 .67 1.44 .01 .30 <.01 .15 0.31 .34 .67 .08 .51
US election
R2 = 0.884 R2 = 0.738 R2 = 0.27 R2 = 0.55
−3 −0.36 .10 .31 .17 .48 0.13 .52 .62 .60 .75 0.24 .21 .64 .13 .65 0.27 .18 .55 .04 .43
−2 −0.2 .38 .61 .48 .72 0.05 .79 .84 .63 .77 −0.13 .54 .82 .27 .75 −0.52 <.01 .13 <.01 .09
−1 0 .78 .87 .80 .90 0.4 .38 .48 .28 .47 0.31 .13 .58 .08 .61 −0.45 .01 .22 <.01 .24
0 −0.01 .68 .81 .42 .69 −0.78 .28 .38 .11 .25 0.41 .04 .44 <.01 .34 0.59 .01 .20 <.01 .15
1 −1.39 <.01 <.01 .01 .12 −2.5 .04 .06 .02 .05 −2.58 <.01 <.01 <.01 .07 −1.58 <.01 <.01 <.01 .11
2 −0.91 .05 .20 .39 .67 −0.21 .00 .00 .00 .00 −2.13 <.01 <.01 <.01 .11 −1.81 <.01 <.01 <.01 .06
3 −0.5 .02 .12 .01 .16 −1.57 .09 .15 .06 .15 −0.44 .03 .42 .22 .72 −0.03 .18 .55 .47 .79
4 −0.58 .84 .90 .93 .97 0.61 .21 .30 .31 .51 −0.45 .04 .44 .02 .46 −0.18 .83 .92 .86 .95
5 −0.11 .13 .36 .08 .34 −0.05 .93 .95 .28 .47 0.63 <.01 .24 <.01 .37 −0.13 .68 .86 .50 .81
(−1; 1) −1.76 <.01 .02 <.01 .08 −3.15 .08 .14 .14 .30 −1.93 <.01 .06 <.01 .14 −0.72 .01 .18 .04 .42
(−1; 3) −3.17 <.01 .01 .03 .22 −4.94 .06 .10 .18 .36 −4.5 <.01 <.01 <.01 .17 −2.57 <.01 .01 <.01 .21
(−1; 5) −3.86 <.01 .01 .04 .26 −4.38 .12 .19 .34 .54 −4.32 <.01 .01 <.01 .23 −2.88 <.01 .01 <.01 .22
(−3; 3) −3.37 <.01 .02 .06 .31 −4.49 .12 .18 .32 .52 −4.32 <.01 .01 <.01 .25 −3.54 <.01 <.01 <.01 .13
Housing Fossil Clean
Climategate
R2 = 0.774 R2 = 0.722 R2 = 0.743
−3 −0.34 .53 .75 .10 .48 0.84 .06 .50 <.01 .28 0.21 .89 .96 .81 .94
−2 0.04 .99 .00 .98 .99 −0.26 .64 .87 .09 .74 1.01 .14 .52 .01 .38
−1 1.11 .11 .41 <.01 .04 −1.28 .01 .34 <.01 .06 −0.3 .54 .80 .02 .44
0 −1.51 .02 .20 <.01 .02 −0.54 .19 .65 <.01 .47 −0.43 .41 .73 .04 .50
1 1.18 .11 .41 <.01 .10 −0.58 .19 .66 <.01 .37 0.69 .32 .67 .01 .36
2 0.41 .56 .77 .11 .49 −0.81 .09 .55 <.01 .45 0.6 .35 .69 <.01 .25
3 −0.21 .63 .81 .33 .69 −0.82 .07 .52 <.01 .27 −0.45 .34 .69 .04 .50













5 −0.7 .23 .54 <.01 .01 0.12 .54 .84 .15 .78 −0.39 .48 .77 .03 .45
(−1; 1) −0.67 .35 .64 .05 .38 −0.28 .71 .90 .33 .85 0.46 .85 .94 .64 .89
(−1; 3) −0.47 .50 .74 .19 .58 −1.92 .07 .52 <.01 .36 0.61 .89 .95 .76 .93
(−1; 5) −1.81 .16 .47 .01 .21 −2.49 .07 .52 <.01 .25 −0.35 .58 .82 .27 .74
(−3; 3) 0.68 .94 .97 .89 .96 −3.45 .01 .33 <.01 .18 1.32 .63 .84 .40 .80
Fukushima
R2 = 0.762 R2 = 0.718 R2 = 0.762
−3 0.52 .05 .36 <.01 .12 −1.28 <.01 .07 <.01 .10 −0.43 .30 .65 .09 .57
−2 0.19 .43 .73 .19 .65 −0.58 .03 .41 <.01 .30 0.31 .24 .61 .12 .61
−1 0.52 .07 .41 .06 .50 −2.17 <.01 .01 <.01 .04 −0.71 .03 .32 .01 .31
0 0.2 .39 .71 .03 .43 0.67 .01 .30 .01 .49 −1.1 <.01 .16 <.01 .13
1 −0.04 .97 .99 .95 .98 1.4 <.01 .07 <.01 .10 3.11 <.01 <.01 <.01 .19
2 0.81 .01 .19 .01 .28 −0.03 .66 .88 .62 .91 4.03 <.01 <.01 <.01 .11
3 −0.15 .59 .81 .36 .75 0.72 .02 .37 .01 .47 0.05 .38 .71 .32 .75
4 −0.24 .37 .69 .26 .70 1.57 <.01 .04 <.01 .03 0.18 .22 .59 .16 .64
5 0.35 .17 .54 .05 .46 −0.94 <.01 .20 <.01 .22 −0.63 .17 .54 .29 .73
(−1; 1) 0.69 .10 .46 <.01 .20 0.8 .08 .52 .02 .56 1.58 .02 .24 .02 .41
(−1; 3) 1.35 .03 .29 <.01 .05 1.49 .01 .34 .01 .54 5.66 <.01 <.01 <.01 .13
(−1; 5) 1.45 .04 .32 <.01 .03 2.13 .01 .26 <.01 .26 5.21 <.01 .01 <.01 .20
(−3; 3) 2.06 .01 .19 <.01 .13 −1.25 .07 .50 .03 .59 5.26 <.01 .02 <.01 .20
Paris agreement
R2 = 0.475 R2 = 0.54 R2 = 0.572
−3 0.79 <.01 .18 <.01 .29 −1.04 .01 .31 <.01 .21 −0.1 .61 .82 .62 .86
−2 −0.53 .01 .37 <.01 .36 0.54 .11 .59 .02 .66 −0.66 .04 .31 .02 .34
−1 −0.23 .20 .66 .13 .71 1.59 <.01 .12 <.01 .33 1.11 <.01 .12 <.01 .09
0 −0.33 .05 .49 .06 .63 0.07 .84 .95 .74 .96 1.98 <.01 .04 .01 .33
1 0.32 .10 .57 .05 .62 −0.07 .00 .00 .00 .00 0.64 .16 .52 .11 .56
2 0.82 <.01 .16 <.01 .21 −1.64 <.01 .17 <.01 .50 3.17 <.01 <.01 <.01 .04
3 0.59 .01 .34 .01 .46 −0.56 .14 .62 <.01 .41 1.05 .01 .15 <.01 .06
4 −0.03 .88 .96 .83 .96 0.87 .02 .40 <.01 .46 1.57 <.01 .06 <.01 .08
5 −0.43 .05 .48 .02 .54 −0.69 .06 .52 .01 .63 0.44 .42 .72 .29 .71
(−1; 1) 0.77 .04 .48 .02 .55 −1.04 .11 .58 .04 .70 2.52 .01 .14 .04 .44
(−1; 3) 2.18 <.01 .12 <.01 .16 −3.24 <.01 .22 <.01 .24 6.74 <.01 <.01 <.01 .13
(−1; 5) 1.73 <.01 .28 <.01 .37 −3.05 .01 .32 <.01 .47 8.75 <.01 <.01 <.01 .14
(−3; 3) 1.42 .02 .39 .01 .45 −1.11 .42 .79 .16 .81 7.19 <.01 .01 <.01 .11
US election
R2 = 0.41 R2 = 0.641 R2 = 0.67
−3 −0.39 .02 .46 <.01 .48 −0.82 .04 .48 <.01 .37 −0.49 .14 .46 .02 .32
−2 0.63 <.01 .25 <.01 .23 −0.59 .16 .64 <.01 .25 −0.38 .31 .62 .15 .56



























Day (s) AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP AR Patell aPatell BMP aBMP
0 0.04 .80 .94 .64 .92 −0.34 .43 .80 <.01 .54 0.22 .71 .86 .65 .86
1 −1.74 <.01 .01 <.01 .30 −2.37 <.01 .06 <.01 .01 −5.09 <.01 <.01 <.01 .02
2 −1.33 <.01 .06 <.01 .49 −3.93 <.01 .01 <.01 <.01 −2.1 <.01 <.01 <.01 .10
3 0.11 .51 .84 .66 .92 −3.65 <.01 .01 <.01 <.01 −1.56 <.01 .03 <.01 .09
4 1.53 <.01 .01 <.01 .23 −2.01 <.01 .09 <.01 .04 −0.78 .01 .18 .01 .20
5 −0.9 <.01 .12 <.01 .26 1.88 <.01 .12 <.01 .45 0.27 .21 .54 .16 .56
(−1; 1) −2.09 <.01 .06 <.01 .18 −3.52 <.01 .11 <.01 .01 −5.35 <.01 <.01 <.01 .03
(−1; 3) −3.3 <.01 .03 <.01 .30 −11.1 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 −9.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .02
(−1; 5) −2.67 <.01 .14 <.01 .46 −11.23 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 −9.52 <.01 <.01 <.01 .04
(−3; 3) −2.7 <.01 .14 <.01 .42 −12.06 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 −9.96 <.01 <.01 <.01 .02
Note: The table reports estimated abnormal returns separately for three days before the event and five days after and CAR for various event windows (column AR), given in %. The abnormal
returns were calculated based on the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French 1993), and tested by the parametric (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 1991) test (column BMP) and
Patell’s test (1976; column Patell). Columns aBMP and aPatell report the tests mentioned above, but adjusted for the cross-sectional correlation by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The table
reports test results as p-values (since t-values are not directly comparable between samples due to different degrees of freedom). The underlined p-values are significant at the 10%
level, and those in bold are significant at the 5% level. R2 shows a median coefficient of determination within each type.
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